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Extraction of uniform randomness from (noisy) non-uniform sources is an important
primitive in many security applications, e.g. (pseudo-)random number generators, privacy-
preserving biometrics, and key storage based on Physical Unclonable Functions. Generic
extraction methods exist, using universal hash functions. There is a trade-off between
the length of the extracted bit string and the uniformity of the string. In the literature
there are proven lower bounds on this length as a function of the desired uniformity.
The best known bound involves a quantity known as smooth min-entropy. Unfortunately,
there exist at least three deﬁnitions of smooth entropy. In this paper we compare three of
these deﬁnitions, and we derive improved lower bounds on the extractable randomness.
We also investigate the use of almost universal hash functions, which are slightly worse at
extracting randomness than universal hash functions, but are preferable in practice because
they require far less resources in devices. We show that using them has negligible effect
on the extractable randomness.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Randomness extraction from non-uniform noisy sources
Many cryptographic applications require input bitstrings to be uniformly distributed and exactly reproducible. Crypto-
graphic keys, for instance, have to be uniformly random in order to prevent eﬃcient attacks; they have to be reproducible
in order to allow for decryption of encrypted data, veriﬁcation of signatures, successful authentication etc. Even a single bit
error in a key causes failure.
Physical sources of randomness, however, are neither uniform nor noise-free. Consider for example biometric mea-
surements. The patterns in ﬁngerprints and iris scans do not follow a uniform distribution, and they are never exactly
re-obtained when a measurement is repeated. Measurement noise can be due to many factors, e.g. differences in lighting
conditions or sensor alignment, physiological changes, difference between sensors etc. Another class of physical sources
that has received a lot of attention recently are the Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), also known as Physical One-Way
Functions, Physical Random Functions and Physically Obscured Keys. PUFs can be regarded as ‘non-biological biometrics’ in
the sense that an identiﬁcation/authentication string or secret key is derived from measuring an intrinsic property of an ob-
ject. Many types of physical system for use as a PUF have been described in the literature, for instance three-dimensional
multiple scattering of laser light [13], reﬂection of laser light from paper ﬁbers [2], randomized dielectric properties in
protective coatings on integrated circuits [21], radiofrequent responses from pieces of metal wire [5] or thin-ﬁlm resonators
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a non-uniform noisy source in view of possible typing mistakes.
For security and/or privacy reasons it is often necessary to apply a one-way hash function to the measurement of the
biometric/PUF. Usually an attacker model is adopted where attacks by insiders have to be taken into account. Hence the
storage of biometric/PUF data is assumed to be public. The hashing step hides the measurement data from the attacker.
However, as the measurements are noisy, it is not possible to directly apply a hash function; a single bit error in the input
causes roughly 50% of the output bits to ﬂip. Hence, an error-correction step is required ﬁrst (‘information reconciliation’).
This is not trivial, since the redundancy data has to be stored publicly and may reveal too much privacy-sensitive informa-
tion. Similarly, if PUF data is to be used as a cryptographic key, then it should be thoroughly noise-corrected ﬁrst. Here, too,
it is crucial that the publicly stored redundancy data does not reveal secrets (in this case the extracted key).
After information reconciliation, the step of privacy ampliﬁcation is applied, mapping a non-uniform random string to
a shorter, almost uniform string. The requirement of uniformity is obvious in the case of key extraction. Interestingly,
extracting uniform bitstrings is also desirable in biometric identiﬁcation and PUF-based anti-counterfeiting, applications
where the identiﬁers are not considered to be secret. A uniform string is the most eﬃcient way of storing the entropy
present in a measurement. Furthermore, database search speed is improved. Apart from biometrics and PUF applications,
the subject of privacy ampliﬁcation is highly relevant to other areas, e.g. true random number generation.
The concept of a Fuzzy Extractor [6,7], also known as a helper data scheme [12], was introduced as a primitive that
achieves both information reconciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation.1 The publicly stored enrolment data (a.k.a. secure sketch
or helper data) suﬃces to reproducibly reconstruct a string from noisy measurements, yet leaks only a negligible amount
of information about the measurement or the extracted key. An overview of privacy-preserving biometrics, PUFs and fuzzy
extraction is given in [22].
1.2. Lower bound on the extractable information
It is, of course, important to know which key length is safe to extract from a source. ‘Safe’ here means that the key’s
distribution is suﬃciently close to uniform.
Let X denote the noisy measurement, and Y the helper data suﬃcient to reduce the errors to a tolerable level. The quan-
tity εext(X |Y ) is deﬁned as the maximum achievable key length that can be extracted from X , given that the adversary
knows Y , such that the distribution of the key is ε-close to uniform. (This statement is made more precise in Section 2.)
Similarly, a quantity εext(X) is deﬁned in the case of a noise-free source X . In [15] Renner and Wolf provided a lower bound
on εext(X |Y ) in terms of the smooth min-entropy of X given Y . Loosely speaking, ‘smoothening’ of a probability distribution
means probing a small neighborhood of it; the smooth entropy is the entropy of a point in this neighborhood. (This is made
more precise in Section 2.)
The technique of smoothening has been used before in many papers (e.g. [9]) under a variety of names. In [1], a random
variable is said to have “-HILL-type pseudoentropy at least k” if there exists a random variable X ′ with min-entropy at
least k such that the (computational) distance between X and X ′ is at most  . However, Renner and Wolf actually deﬁned
the smooth min-entropy of X as a uniquely determined quantity (by taking the maximum value for k), which can then be
studied in its own right. The lower bound given in [15] is
εext(X |Y ) Hρ∞(X |Y ) − log
1
(ε − ρ)2 . (1)
Here ρ ∈ [0, ε) is the ‘radius’ of the smoothening neighborhood, and Hρ∞ is the smooth min-entropy. This bound is sharper
than previous results, which do not have the smoothening degree of freedom. It was also shown in [15] that the extractable
randomness can be upper-bounded by the smooth min-entropy, i.e. (1) is optimal up to a function of ε and ρ .
Eq. (1) should be read as a maximization of the right-hand size over the smoothening parameter ρ . A nonzero ρ
increases the term Hρ∞(X |Y ), but gives a penalty in the logarithmic term. The optimal ρ depends on the probability distri-
bution of X, Y .
In the above formulation, the fuzzy extraction seems at ﬁrst glance to be a matter of privacy ampliﬁcation only, without
the information reconciliation discussed at length in Section 1.1. However, the information reconciliation is present implicitly
via the helper data Y , which is always tacitly assumed to provide suﬃcient error-correction redundancy. The choice of Y
has a big inﬂuence on εext(X |Y ), but the formalism used in this paper never makes that explicit.
It is important to note that the bound (1) is not just of theoretical interest. It guarantees that well-known generic privacy
ampliﬁcation methods (universal hash functions) yield a key that is ε-close to uniformity as long as the key length does not
exceed the r.h.s. of (1). This is relevant even when the distribution of X, Y is precisely known and by sheer luck happens to
be such that the complete min-entropy can be extracted by a tailor-made binning scheme; in practice it may be diﬃcult to
implement the scheme on a constrained device. Hence, a sharp lower bound on εext has practical implications.
While the result (1) is very useful, some unsatisfactory issues remain. Unfortunately, at least three different deﬁnitions
of smooth entropy appear in the literature [15,16,10,14,11], and it is not immediately clear if they are equivalent. While it
1 In this setting there is no additional source of randomness to aid the privacy ampliﬁcation.
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for bounds such as (1) are less evident.
Furthermore, the deﬁnition of smoothening employed in [15] involves distributions that are not normalized. While that
is not a problem in itself, it can lead to technical diﬃculties when smooth entropies are applied in a context that requires
normalization (see Sections 2 and 3.2).
1.3. Contributions and outline
In this paper we address the issue of the multiple deﬁnitions of smooth entropy, and we provide lower bounds on
extractable randomness that are tighter than previously stated in the literature.
We introduce notation and give a list of deﬁnitions in Section 2.1. We then present a number of useful lemmas in
Section 2.2. Two of these are novel, concerning the leftover hash lemma in the case of un-normalized distributions.
Our main results are stated in Section 3. We ﬁrst prove a sharper lower bound on the extractable randomness in the
unconditional case (Theorem 1). The improvement has two causes:
(a) We make use of the leftover hash lemma for un-normalized distributions. This has the effect of reducing the penalty
term log(ε − ρ)2 to logε(ε − ρ).
(b) We use Rényi entropy of order 2 (H2) instead of min-entropy. In this way the bound is written in terms of the quantity
that naturally appears in the leftover hash lemma, without losses from further inequalities.2
We illustrate the improvement in graphs. For low-entropy sources, the relative improvement in the amount of extracted
random bits is signiﬁcant.
We prove a bound (Theorem 2) for the conditional case that is sharper than (1). It is formulated in terms of the smooth
average conditional Rényi entropy of order two. The average conditional Rényi entropy (H˜2) is the natural quantity appearing
in the leftover hash lemma.3 We show that the above-mentioned beneﬁcial effect (a) does not occur in the conditional
case.
We compare three of the existing deﬁnitions of smooth entropy regarding their impact on provable bounds on ran-
domness extraction. It turns out that they are not all equivalent in this respect. The two deﬁnitions with un-normalized
distributions give identical results. However, the ‘normalized’ version of smoothening yields less sharp bounds. The under-
lying reason is that the normalization constraint effectively doubles the statistical distance between a distribution and its
smoothened version, as compared to un-normalized smoothening.
The results above are based on the existence of universal families of hash functions (also called ‘two-universal’). In
Section 4 we study the case of almost universal families of hash functions [18,19]. These do not achieve the same amount
of privacy ampliﬁcation, but require signiﬁcantly less nonvolatile storage to implement and are therefore often preferable in
practice. We show that their use has a negligible effect on the extractable randomness.
2. Preliminaries
In Section 2.1 we ﬁrst introduce the notation that will be used in the rest of the paper. Then we list a number of
deﬁnitions in order to specify precisely which notions of distance, entropies, smoothening and extractability we are talking
about.
Throughout this paper we make an effort to use notation which explicitly shows which variables are operated on by
a mapping. In particular, the notation always makes it evident that an entropy is a function of a distribution (as opposed
to a random variable). For instance, for a random variable X with distribution P, we always write H(P) for the entropy
instead of the more usual notation H(X). This will sometimes lead to awkward superscripts, but it is a price worth paying
for the improved clarity. Clarity is especially needed when smooth entropies are handled. A smoothened distribution is not
necessarily normalized; this makes it diﬃcult to write statements like “variable X has distribution Q”. In order to avoid
such awkwardness we concentrate on statements about distributions. We formulate all the deﬁnitions in such a way that
they apply to normalized as well as un-normalized distributions.
In Section 2.2 we list some lemmas that are necessary to prove our results.
2.1. Notation and deﬁnitions
We denote stochastic variables by capitals, speciﬁc values by lowercase letters, and spaces by calligraphic symbols.
Distributions are written in mathbold font. E.g. X ∈ X , X ∼ P, Pr[X = x] = P(x). The notation PX denotes the space of
non-negative functions on X . As a distance measure between distributions we use the usual deﬁnition of statistical dis-
tance, generalized to arbitrary non-negative functions. The notation UX stands for the uniform distribution over a set X .
2 The use of H2 is not new in itself, nor is the smooth variant H
ρ
2 , and replacing H∞ by H
ρ
2 is straightforward. However, we want to stress that the
results in the literature, which are usually stated in terms of min-entropy, can be improved upon when every last bit counts.
3 It was already pointed out in [7] that worst-case conditioning in the conditional min-entropy H∞(X |Y ) can be replaced by average-case conditioning.
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(P,Q) = 1
2
∑
x∈X
∣∣P(x) −Q(x)∣∣.
For (X, Y ) ∼ P, the marginal distribution of X is denoted as P1, with Pr[X = x] = P1(x) = ∑y P(x, y). Similarly,
Pr[Y = y] = P2(y) = ∑x P(x, y). The conditional probability Pr[X = x | Y = y] is denoted as P1|2(x, y) = P(x, y)/P2(y).4
The advantage of this notation is that marginals and conditioning can be easily written down for un-normalized distribu-
tions.
Deﬁnition 2 (Rényi entropy). Let P ∈ PX . For α ∈ (0,1) ∪ (1,∞), the Rényi entropy of P is deﬁned as
Hα(P) = − 1
α − 1 log
∑
x∈X
[
P(x)
]α
.
For 0 α  β it holds that Hβ(P) Hα(P).
Deﬁnition 3 (Min-entropy). Let P ∈ PX . The min-entropy of P is deﬁned as
H∞(P) = − logmax
x∈X P(x).
Deﬁnition 4 (Conditional Rényi entropy). Let P ∈ PX×Y . Let α ∈ (0,1) ∪ (1,∞). The conditional Rényi entropy is deﬁned as
Hα(1|2)(P) = − 1
α − 1 log maxy∈suppP2
∑
x∈X
[
P1|2(x, y)
]α
.
Deﬁnition 5 (Conditional min-entropy). Let P ∈ PX×Y . The conditional min-entropy of P is deﬁned as
H∞(1|2)(P) = − logmax
x∈X maxy∈suppP2
P1|2(x, y).
For (X, Y ) ∼ P the conditional min-entropy is usually denoted as H∞(X |Y ).
Deﬁnition 6 (Average conditional min-entropy). (From [7].) Let P ∈ PX×Y . The average conditional min-entropy of P, with
conditioning on the second argument, is deﬁned as
H˜∞(1|2)(P) = − log
∑
y∈Y
P2(y)max
x∈X P1|2(x, y) = − log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X P(x, y).
The usual notation is H˜∞(X |Y ) for (X, Y ) ∼ P.
Deﬁnition 7 (Average conditional Rényi entropy). Let P be a probability measure on X × Y , and let (X, Y ) ∼ P. Let α ∈
(0,1) ∪ (1,∞). The average conditional Rényi entropy of X given Y is deﬁned as
H˜α(1|2)(P) = − 1
α − 1 log
∑
y∈Y
P2(y)
∑
x∈X
[
P1|2(x, y)
]α
.
The following two deﬁnitions are somewhat awkward, but they allow us to generalize stochastic variables like f (X) to
the case of un-normalized distributions.
Deﬁnition 8 (Induced action on a distribution). Let f : R × X → Z be a function, with the ﬁrst argument drawn uniformly
random from R. Let P ∈ PX and X ∼ P. We deﬁne the induced action of f on P as a mapping f ∗ : PX → PR×Z , with(
f ∗P
)
(r, t) = Pr[R = r, f (R, X) = t]= 1|R| ∑
x∈X : f (r,x)=t
P(x).
4 We use the convention P1|2(x, y) = 0 when P2(y) = 0.
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random from R. Let P ∈ PX×Y and (X, Y ) ∼ P. We deﬁne the induced action of F on P as a mapping F ∗ : PX×Y →
PY×R×Z , with(
F ∗P
)
(y, r, t) = Pr[Y = y, R = r, F (R, X) = t]= 1|R|P2(y) ∑
x∈X : F (r,x)=t
P1|2(x, y).
Next we show three different notions of smooth entropy that appear in the literature. They differ in the sort of modiﬁca-
tions to the probability distribution that are allowed. In order to distinguish between them we introduce the terms ‘strictly
bounded’, ‘loosely bounded’ and ‘normalized’.
Deﬁnition 10 (Strictly bounded vicinity of a distribution). (From [11].) Let P be a probability measure on X . Let ρ  0. We
deﬁne the strictly bounded ρ-vicinity of P as
Bρstrict(P) =
{
Q ∈ PX : ∀x∈XQ(x) P(x),
∑
x∈X
Q(x) 1− ρ
}
.
Note that Q ∈ Bρ(P) with Q 
= P is not a probability measure.
Deﬁnition 11 (Normalized vicinity of a distribution). Let P be a probability measure on X . Let ρ  0. The normalized ρ-vicinity
of P is deﬁned as
Bρnorm(P) =
{
Q ∈ PX : (Q,P) ρ,
∑
x∈X
Q(x) = 1
}
.
Deﬁnition 12 (Loosely bounded vicinity of a distribution). Let P be a probability measure on X . Let ρ  0. The loosely bounded
ρ-vicinity of P is deﬁned as
Bρloose(P) =
{
Q ∈ PX : (Q,P) ρ
2
,
∑
x∈X
Q(x) 1
}
.
The strictly bounded version appeared in [15] (unnumbered deﬁnition) and [11]. The loosely bounded version appeared
in [14, Deﬁnition 3.2.1]. The normalized version was used in [10]. (Yet another deﬁnition features in [16], but we will not
discuss it here.)
For all three types of vicinity, the smooth entropy is deﬁned analogously. In the deﬁnitions below, the subscript ‘type’
denotes the type of vicinity. The result (1) from [15] was formulated in terms of the ‘strictly bounded’ vicinity.
Deﬁnition 13 (Smooth Rényi entropy). Let P be a probability measure on X . Let ρ  0. The smooth Rényi entropy of P is
deﬁned as
Hρ,typeα (P) = max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
Hα(Q).
Deﬁnition 14 (Smooth conditional Rényi entropy). Let P be a probability measure on X ×Y . Let ρ  0 and α ∈ (0,1)∪ (1,∞).
The ρ-smooth conditional Rényi entropy of order α of P is deﬁned as
Hρ,typeα(1|2) (P) = max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
1
1− α log maxy∈suppP2
∑
x∈X
[
Q(x, y)
P2(y)
]α
.
Deﬁnition 15 (Smooth conditional min-entropy). Let P be a probability measure on X ×Y . Let ρ  0. The smooth conditional
min-entropy is deﬁned as
Hρ,type∞(1|2)(P) = max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
− log max
y∈suppP2
max
x∈X
Q(x, y)
P2(y)
.
The usual notation is Hρ∞(X |Y ) for (X, Y ) ∼ P. Note that the smooth entropies in Deﬁnitions 14 and 15 cannot be written
as a maximization maxQ of some expression in Q only. It will turn out that we need such a property later on; hence we
introduce the following deﬁnition.
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(0,1) ∪ (1,∞). The ρ-smooth average conditional Rényi entropy of order α of P is deﬁned as
H˜ρ,typeα(1|2) (P) = max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
H˜α(1|2)(Q).
The smooth average conditional min-entropy follows by setting α = ∞. Next we give the formal deﬁnition of extractable
randomness. This quantity plays a central role in Section 3.
Deﬁnition 17 (Extractable randomness). (See Deﬁnition 3 in [15].) Let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be random variables, with (X, Y ) ∼ P.
Let R be a random variable independent of X and Y , uniformly distributed on some set R. For any ε > 0 we say that a
ﬁnite set Z is ε-allowed if there exists a function F : X ×R → Z such that

(
F ∗P,P2 × UR × UZ
)
 ε.
The ε-extractable randomness of X conditioned on Y is deﬁned as
εext(X |Y ) = max
{
log |Z|: Z is ε-allowed}.
The deﬁnition of extractable randomness in the unconditional case follows from Deﬁnition 17 by omitting Y . Lower
bounds on the extractable randomness are proven using universal hash functions.
Deﬁnition 18 (Universal family of hash functions). (See [3].) Let R, X and T be ﬁnite sets. Let {Φr}r∈R be a family of hash
functions from X to T . The family {Φr}r∈R is called universal iff, for R drawn uniformly from R, it holds that
Pr
[
ΦR(x) = ΦR
(
x′
)]
 1/|T |
for all x, x′ ∈ X with x′ 
= x.
Such a family is alternatively known as ‘two-universal’. We also give the deﬁnition of a more general class of hash
functions.
Deﬁnition 19 (Almost universal family of hash functions). (See [18,19].) Let η  0. Let R, X and T be ﬁnite sets. Let {Φr}r∈R
be a family of hash functions from X to T . The family {Φr}r∈R is called η-almost universal iff, for R drawn uniformly
from R, it holds that
Pr
[
ΦR(x) = ΦR
(
x′
)]
 η
for all x, x′ ∈ X with x′ 
= x.
Note that a 1/|T |-almost universal family of hash functions is universal. The above deﬁned classes of hash functions play
a central role in this paper: They are used in Lemmas 4 and 5 in Section 2.2, on which our main results are based.
2.2. Lemmas
Lemma 1 (Jensen’s inequality for concave functions). Let ϕ be a real concave function. Let n be a positive integer. Let a1, . . . ,an be
positive weights and x1, . . . , xn be real numbers. Then
ϕ
(∑n
i=1 aixi∑n
i=1 ai
)

∑n
i=1 aiϕ(xi)∑n
i=1 ai
.
Lemma 2. (See Exercise 8.36 in [17].) Let q1, . . . ,qm be real numbers satisfying
∑m
s=1 qs = 1. Then it holds that
m∑
s=1
q2s 
1
m
.
Proof. 0
∑
s(qs − 1m )2 =
∑
s q
2
s − 2m
∑
s qs +
∑
s 1/m
2 =∑s q2s − 1m . 
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the statistical distance betweenQ and the uniform distribution U can be bounded as
(Q,U ) 1
2
√
|Z|
∑
z∈Z
Q2(z) − 1+ 2α. (2)
Proof. Deﬁne D = (Q,U ) and qz := |Q(z) − 1|Z| |/2D satisfying
∑
z qz = 1. Application of Lemma 2 yields 1|Z| 
1
4D2
[∑zQ2(z) − 2|Z| ∑zQ(z) +∑z |Z|−2] = 14D2 [∑zQ2(z) − 2|Z| (1− α) + 1|Z| ]. Rearranging the inequality gives (2). 
Lemma 4 (Leftover hash lemma in the unconditional case). (Generalization of Theorem 8.37 in [17] to un-normalized distributions.)
Let α ∈ [0,1). Let X be a ﬁnite set. Let Q ∈ PX satisfy∑x∈X Q(x) = 1− α. Let f : R×X → {0,1} be an η-almost universal hash
function (see Deﬁnition 19), with η = (1 + δ)2− , and with r drawn uniformly random from R. Let f ∗Q be the induced action of f
on Q, as given in Deﬁnition 8. Then

(
f ∗Q,UR ⊗ U
)
 1
2
√
α2 + δ + 2−H2(Q), (3)
where UR stands for the uniform distribution on R and U stands for the uniform distribution on {0,1} .
A proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 5 (Leftover hash lemma in the conditional case). (Generalization of Exercise 8.71 in [17] to un-normalized distributions.) Let
β ∈ [0,1). Let Q ∈ PX×Y such that ∑x∈X ,y∈Y Q(x, y) = 1 − β . Let F : R × X → {0,1} be an η-almost universal hash function,
with η = (1+ δ)2− , and with r drawn randomly from R. Let F ∗Q be the induced action of F on Q as given in Deﬁnition 9. Then

(
F ∗Q,Q2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U
)
 1
2
√
1− β
√
δ + 2−H˜2(1|2)(Q).
We provide a proof in Appendix A. Remark: Lemmas 4 and 5 can also be formulated with H∞ instead of H2, since
H2(Q) H∞(Q).
Lemma 6. Let P be a probability measure on X . Let ρ  0. Then for any Q ∈ Bρstrict(P)
(P,Q) 1
2
ρ.
Proof. (P,Q) = 12
∑
x∈X |P(x) −Q(x)| = 12 [1−
∑
x∈X Q(x)] 12ρ . 
Lemma 7. Let P be a probability measure on X ×Y . Let ρ  0. Then for any Q ∈ Bρstrict(P)
(P2,Q2)
1
2
ρ.
Proof. (P2,Q2) = 12
∑
y |
∑
x P(x, y) −
∑
xQ(x, y)| = 12 [1−
∑
xyQ(x, y)] 12ρ . 
Lemma 8. Let P be a probability measure on X ×Y . Let ρ  0. Then it holds that
H˜ρ,type2(1|2) (P) H
ρ,type
∞(1|2)(P).
Proof. We use that H˜ρ,type2(1|2) (P) H˜
ρ,type
∞(1|2)(P). Moreover,
H˜ρ,type∞(1|2)(P) = max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
H˜∞(1|2)(Q)
= max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
− log
∑
y∈Y
Q2(y)max
x∈X Q1|2(x, y)
= max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
− log
∑
max
x∈X Q(x, y)y∈Y
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Q∈Bρtype(P)
− log
∑
y∈suppP2
P2(y)max
x∈X
Q(x, y)
P2(y)
 max
Q∈Bρtype(P)
− log max
y∈suppP2
max
x∈X
Q(x, y)
P2(y)
= Hρ,type∞(1|2)(P). 
3. Main result
We prove two theorems regarding the lower bound on extractable randomness (see Deﬁnition 17). Both provide an
improved bound in terms of the ‘strictly bounded’ type of smooth entropy. The ﬁrst theorem addresses the unconditional
case. The second theorem addresses the conditional case. The proofs are based on the existence of universal families of hash
functions (see Deﬁnition 18). The more general (and more easy to implement) case of almost universal hash functions is
treated in Section 4.
Theorem 1. Let X ∼ P be a random variable. Let ε > 0. Then
εext(X) max
ρ∈[0,ε)
[
Hρ,strict2 (P) + 2− log
1
ε(ε − ρ)
]
.
Theorem 2. Let P be a probability measure on X ×Y , and (X, Y ) ∼ P. Let ε > 0. Then
εext(X |Y ) max
ρ∈[0,ε)
[
H˜ρ,strict2(1|2) (P) + 2− log
1− ρ
(ε − ρ)2
]
.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider Qˆ ∈ Bρstrict(P) achieving H2(Qˆ) = Hρ,strict2 (P). We explicitly use the fact that
∑
x∈X Qˆ(x) =
1 − ρ . Consider a function f : X × R → {0,1} , with  = Hρ,strict2 (P) + 2 − log 1ε(ε−ρ) whose output has distance from uni-
formity ε − ρ/2. Its existence is guaranteed by Lemma 4 (taking δ = 0 since we consider universal hash functions, and
substituting α = ρ). It is readily veriﬁed that substitution of  into (3) yields statistical distance ε − ρ/2 from unifor-
mity.
When f is applied to Qˆ, the result is a string of length , with uniformity ε − ρ/2. What happens when f is applied
to P? Then the uniformity is bounded as follows

(
f ∗P,UR ⊗ U
)

(
f ∗P, f ∗Qˆ
)+ ( f ∗Qˆ,UR ⊗ U)
(UR ⊗ P,UR ⊗ Qˆ) + (ε − ρ/2)
 ρ/2+ (ε − ρ/2) = ε. (4)
In the ﬁrst line we used the triangle inequality. In the second line we used the uniformity property of the extractor f .
Finally in the third line we applied Lemma 6. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider Qˆ ∈ Bρstrict(P) achieving H˜2(1|2)(Qˆ) = H˜ρ,strict2(1|2) (P). The existence of such a Qˆ follows directly
from Deﬁnition 16. Next we explicitly use that
∑
x∈X , y∈Y Qˆ(x, y) = 1− ρ . Consider a function F : X × R → {0,1} , acting
on the source Qˆ, extracting a string of length  = H˜ρ,strict2(1|2) (P) + 2 − 2 log
√
1−ρ
ε−ρ that has uniformity ε − ρ . The existence of
such F is guaranteed by Lemma 5 (again setting δ = 0, and substituting β = ρ). What happens when F is applied to P
instead of Qˆ? We ﬁrst apply the triangle inequality,

(
F ∗P,P2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U
)

(
F ∗P, F ∗Qˆ
)+ (F ∗Qˆ,P2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U). (5)
The ﬁrst term in (5) is bounded by using the fact that conditioning reduces the statistical distance,

(
F ∗P, F ∗Qˆ
)
(UR ⊗ P,UR ⊗ Qˆ) = (P, Qˆ) 1
2
ρ. (6)
The last term in (5) is bounded by using one more triangle inequality.

(
F ∗Qˆ,P2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U
)

(
F ∗Qˆ, Qˆ2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U
)+ (Qˆ2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U,P2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U) (7)
 (ε − ρ) + (Qˆ2,P2) (8)
 ε − 1ρ. (9)2
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elements all have probability p2 = (1− sp1)/(2k − s).
Fig. 2. Comparison of the penalty terms in the unconditional case.
In (8) we used the uniformity property of F . In (9) we applied Lemma 7. It follows that

(
F ∗P,P2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U
)
 ε. 
Compared to the proof of Theorem 1 there is one extra ingredient: the extra triangle inequality required to handle the
distance between the marginals P2 and Qˆ2.
3.1. Extractable randomness in the unconditional case
3.1.1. Comparison of Theorem 1 with prior results
• The smooth Rényi entropy of order 2 (Hρ,strict2 ) is larger than the smooth min-entropy (Hρ,strict∞ ) that features in (1).
Fig. 1 shows for a simple example distribution that the difference can be several bits.
• The smoothening ‘penalty’ paid in the logarithm term is less severe than the −2 log(ε − ρ) penalty in (1), as is shown
in Fig. 2. The difference is −2 log(ε − ρ) + logε(ε − ρ) = − log(1− ρ/ε), which can amount to several bits in practice.
For low-entropy sources, the relative improvement due to these two differences can be substantial.
3.1.2. Effect of different smoothening deﬁnitions
What changes when another version of smooth entropy is considered? The two smoothening-related parts of the proof
are the use of the un-normalized version of the leftover hash lemma (Lemma 4), and the ﬁnal step (4), where the sta-
tistical distance between Qˆ and P enters. Let us ﬁrst consider the loosely bounded Hρ,loose2 (P). Here, just as in the ‘strict’
case, the norm of Qˆ is 1 − ρ , and (P, Qˆ) is 12ρ . Hence, in terms of Hρ,loose we get exactly the same statements as in
Theorem 1.
Next we consider the ‘normalized’ Hρ,norm2 . Now we have to use α = 0 in Lemma 4 since Qˆ is normalized. Furthermore
we have (P, Qˆ)  ρ from Deﬁnition 11 as opposed to 12ρ in the other two cases. Following all the steps of the above
proof yields the following result.
εext(X) max
[
Hρ,norm2 (P) + 2− 2 log
1
]
. (10)ρ∈[0,ε) ε − ρ
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ρ,strict
2 (P) will be
roughly the same, since both deﬁnitions of smoothening allow one to remove an amount ρ from the highest probabili-
ties P(x). The logarithmic penalty term of (10), however, is more severe: log 1
(ε−ρ)2  log
1
ε(ε−ρ) . Hence Theorem 1 gives a
sharper bound.
3.2. Extractable randomness in the conditional case
3.2.1. Comparison of Theorem 2 with prior results
• The expression H˜ρ,strict2(1|2) (P) is larger than Hρ,strict∞(1|2)(P) (see Lemma 8) for two reasons. (a) Rényi entropy of order 2 is
larger than min-entropy (see Fig. 1); (b) taking the average over y is more favorable than taking the worst-case y.
• The factor √1− ρ gives a slight improvement over (1) by reducing the penalty term. In fact, this factor was already
present in an expression for the distance between mixed quantum states in [14, Corollary 5.6.1 on p. 88], but the
consequences for extractable randomness were never explicitly stated. In practice ρ is so small that
√
1− ρ ≈ 1, i.e. the
improvement is negligible.
3.2.2. Effect of different smoothening deﬁnitions
We look what changes occur in the proof of Theorem 2 when the ‘strict’ smoothening is replaced by another type. In
the ‘loose’ version nothing changes, since Qˆ will be the same (i.e. an amount ρ removed from the highest peaks), and
(P2, Qˆ2) as well as (P, Qˆ) remain unchanged.
From the ‘loose’ version we directly obtain a bound on the ‘normalized’ version: Since the vicinity Bρnorm is a subset of
B2ρloose we can write H
2ρ,loose  Hρ,norm. This yields the following result.
Theorem 3. Let P be a probability measure on X ×Y , and (X, Y ) ∼ P. Let ε > 0. Then
εext(X |Y ) max
ρ∈[0,ε/2)
[
H˜ρ,norm2(1|2) (P) + 2− log
1− 2ρ
(ε − 2ρ)2
]
.
How does this compare to Theorem 2? As in the unconditional case, for most distributions P it will hold that
H˜ρ,norm2(1|2) (P) ≈ H˜ρ,strict2(1|2) (P). The penalty term is larger. Hence Theorem 2 gives a sharper bound.
It must be remarked, however, that Eq. (10) and Theorem 3 can be useful in contexts where normalization must be
strictly adhered to. For instance, it regularly occurs that a distribution Q is not exactly known, but is guaranteed to be at
most ρ-distant from some distribution P with known properties. Bridging the gap from Q to P can be done by ‘smoothen-
ing’, but only if the normalized version of Deﬁnition 11 is applied.
4. Reduction of storage requirements by using almost universal instead of universal hash functions
An important practical consideration for implementing a randomness extractor is the available nonvolatile memory in a
device. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the information reconciliation step requires storing the helper data. Furthermore, the
privacy ampliﬁcation step also needs storage space. This may not be immediately obvious from the previous sections. In this
step the device needs an implementation of an appropriate hash function. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 require the use
of a universal family of hash functions mapping an input x ∈ X to a smaller target space T . As can be seen in Deﬁnition 18
(p. 1189), these hash functions are labeled by a random variable R ∈ R; the value of R needs to be stored. Both the helper
data and the R value are ‘unique’ in the sense that they are different for each instance of a source and for each enrolment.
Hence these pieces of data are preferably stored in ﬂash or eeprom memory. In resource-constrained devices this type of
memory is expensive. Typical constructions of a universal family of hash functions require that log |R| is (almost) as large
as log |X |. For instance, the construction of Example 8.39 in [17] requires
#bits= log |R| = log |X | − log |T |. (11)
For highly non-uniform sources X this is prohibitive.
It is possible to save on nonvolatile memory by relaxing the constraints on the hash function: By allowing small devia-
tions from perfect universality, it becomes possible to have a tradeoff between the quality of the privacy ampliﬁcation and
the space needed to store R . Deﬁnition 19 introduces η-almost universal families of hash functions.6 There are constructions
[17] of such hash functions, with η = (1+ δ)/|T |, requiring only
log |R| = O
(
log |T | + log log |X |
log |T | + log
1
δ
)
. (12)
5 As long as P is not too close to uniform.
6 Exact universality occurs at η = 1/|T |.
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The incurred penalty log(1/δ) is manageable.
Example. Consider a case where X = {0,1}1024 and T = {0,1}128. For universality we need log |R| = 896 bits of storage,
while for almost universality with δ = 2−16 we only need approximately 147 bits.
Finally we mention that the reduced quality of the privacy ampliﬁcation due to a ﬁnite δ does not lead to signiﬁcant
worsening of the extractable randomness (see [20]).
Theorem 4. Let ε  0. Let X ∼ P be a random variable on X . Let {Φr}r∈R be an η-almost universal family of hash functions from X
to {0,1} , with η = (1 + δ)2− . Then the amount of randomness that can be extracted from X using this family of hash functions is
bounded from below by
εext(X) max
ρ∈[0,ε−δ/[4ε])
[
Hρ,strict2 (P) + 2− log
1
ε(ε − ρ) − δ/4
]
.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 1, but without setting δ = 0. 
Theorem 5. Let ε  0. Let (X, Y ) ∼ P be random variables on X and Y respectively. Let {Φr}r∈R be an η-almost universal family of
hash functions from X to {0,1} , with η = (1 + δ)2− . Then the amount of randomness that can be extracted from X, conditioned
on Y , using this family of hash functions is bounded from below by
εext(X |Y ) max
ρ∈[0,ε−√δ/2)
[
H˜ρ,strict2(1|2) (P) + 2− log
1
(ε − ρ)2 − δ/4
]
.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 2, but without setting δ = 0. 
The effect of nonzero δ on the extractable randomness is negligible as long as δ  ε2.
5. Summary
We have improved the known lower bound on the extractable entropy from non-uniform sources in the unconditional
case (Theorem 1) and in the conditional case (Theorem 2). In the unconditional case, the improvement stems from using
H2 instead of H∞ and from using an un-normalized version of the leftover hash lemma. In the unconditional case, the
improvement comes from using the smooth average conditional Rényi entropy H˜ρ,strict2(1|2) , which is the best match to the entities
appearing in the leftover hash lemma.
We have investigated three of the deﬁnitions of smoothening with respect to their impact on the extractable entropy
bounds. It turns out that the two un-normalized versions are equivalent in this respect, and yield a sharper bound than the
normalized version.
We have studied the amount of nonvolatile memory that is needed to store the random label (R) of the hash functions
employed in privacy ampliﬁcation. A signiﬁcant reduction is known to be achieved (log |X | to log log |X |) by switching from
a universal family of hash functions to an η-almost universal family. We have shown that the penalty paid in the extractable
randomness can be made vanishingly small.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 4. This proof follows the approach in [17], but for an un-normalized distribution Q. We use Lemma 3,
replacing Q in the lemma by f ∗Q and Z by R× {0,1} . We have to compute the collision probability c,
c =
∑
r∈R
∑
t∈{0,1}
[(
f ∗Q
)
(r, t)
]2 = ∑
r∈R
∑
t∈{0,1}
[
1
|R|
∑
x∈X : f (r,x)=t
Q(x)
]2
.
We introduce the notation 〈A〉, for some predicate A, to denote 1 if A is true and 0 if A is false. This allows us to write
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∑
x,x′∈X
Q(x)Q
(
x′
)×∑
r∈R
∑
t∈{0,1}
〈
f (r, x) = t〉〈 f (r, x′)= t〉
= 1|R|
∑
x,x′∈X
Q(x)Q
(
x′
)
Pr
[
f (R, x) = f (R, x′)].
In the last expression the probability is with respect to the random variable R , while x and x′ are ﬁxed. Next we split
the x, x′ summation into a part where x′ = x and a part where x′ 
= x, and we apply the deﬁning property of the almost
universal hash function f .
c = 1|R|
( ∑
x∈X
Q2(x) +
∑
x,x′∈X : x′ 
=x
Q(x)Q
(
x′
)
Pr
[
f (R, x) = f (R, x′)])
 1|R|
( ∑
x∈X
Q2(x) +
∑
x,x′∈X : x′ 
=x
Q(x)Q
(
x′
)1+ δ
2
)
= 1|R × {0,1}|
(
2
∑
x∈X
Q2(x) + (1+ δ)
[
(1− α)2 −
∑
x∈X
Q2(x)
])
 1|R × {0,1}|
(
2
∑
x∈X
Q2(x) + (1− α)2 + δ
)
.
Substitution into Lemma 3 yields Lemma 4. 
Proof of Lemma 5. We begin by introducing the notation Q1|y ∈ PX , where Q1|y(x) :=Q1|2(x, y) and ∑x∈X Q1|y(x) = 1 for
all y. The statistical distance in the lemma can be expressed as

(
F ∗Q,Q2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U
)= ∑
y∈Y
Q2(y)
(
F ∗Q1|y,UR ⊗ U
)
. (13)
We apply Lemma 4 (with α = 0, since Q1|y is normalized) to get

(
F ∗Q1|y,UR ⊗ U
)
 1
2
√
δ + 2−H2(Q1|y). (14)
We substitute this into (13) and then apply Jensen’s inequality for concave functions (Lemma 1). This yields

(
F ∗Q,Q2 ⊗ UR ⊗ U
)
 1
2
√∑
y∈Y
Q2(y)
√∑
y∈Y
Q2(y)
[
δ + 2−H2(Q1|y)]
= 1
2
√
1− β
√
δ(1− β) + 2−H˜2(1|2)(Q).
Lemma 5 follows. 
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